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Abstract
In recent debates, morality or social norms have been proposed as an instrument
to reduce conﬂict behavior. As the argument goes, moral people will not engage in
socially not-tolerated behavior or, less so than amoral people. Analyzing this question
in the framework of contest theory, we ﬁnd that if morality can discriminate between
appropriation and defense, it is an eﬀective instrument to lower socially unwanted
behavior and support the enforcement of property rights. If it cannot discriminate
between these diﬀerent conﬂict eﬀorts, strategic eﬀects due to a one-sided increase in
morality might actually lead to total increased conﬂict eﬀort in the economy.
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11 Introduction
In most societies one can observe major investments into the morality and social values of its
members. Schools, churches, individuals and sometimes governmental institutions spend a
considerable fraction of their resources to instill and sustain a common morality. Among the
most central guidelines are the commandments found in the three big monotheistic religions
“thou shalt not steal” and “thou shalt not kill”. These, among other norms reﬂecting an
underlying morality, have the purpose to suppress harmful and destructive actions. From
an economist’s perspective the question arises why societies care or should care about main-
taining a common morality. These kind of investments do not make sense, if one perceives
decision-makers to be pure homines oeconomici. If human beings had stable preferences
there would be no point in spending resources on generating common values which amounts
to inﬂuence people’s preferences. Furthermore, they do not make sense in an economy where
property rights are costlessly enforced. And they do not make sense in situations that are
devoid of conﬂict. Noting this, can these investments be explained from an economist’s point
of view?
One objective that comes to mind when considering the function of norms and values, is to
make society’s individuals less prone to engage in activities that encompass stealing, socially
destructive, undesirable or wasteful behavior. If we take a broader perspective, namely, that
the enforcement of property rights is costly and that many social interactions have the po-
tential for conﬂict, the beneﬁt of these investments may lie in the fact that they support the
enforcement of property rights and reduce socially harmful activities. For example, Gross-
man (2001) and Grossman and Kim (1995) have argued repeatedly that property rights only
have substance insofar as they can be defended against the appropriative activities of other
individuals. Instruments with which property rights are enforced, encompass private en-
forcement and/or institutional enforcement. Whereas formal institutional enforcement takes
the form of police and other institutions of a law enforcement system, private enforcement
of property rights usually takes the form of a contest: one individual invests resources to
protect her property whereas the other will spend eﬀort to appropriate it. Sometimes, in-
stitutional barriers may deter individuals to engage in such a contest.1 However, there are
many situations in which the use of an institutional form of law enforcement system is too
expensive or ineﬀective. Examples include situations in which the prizes are of little value
or where serious veriﬁcation problems of contracts or actions exist. In such situations, the
result of such a contest and therefore the security of property rights in the absence of other
institutional enforcement is determined by the respective contest technology. If we give up
the strict assumption of homo oeconomicus, these forms of private enforcement could be sup-
ported by informal institutions such as social and moral norms which regulate and reduce
conﬂict behavior.
Following up on this line of thought, we ﬁnd that many situations that are regulated by so-
cial and moral norms turn out to involve situations of conﬂict (Posner, 1997; Shavell, 2002;
1See Kolmar (2003b) for a more careful discussion on the issue of the eﬃciency of property rights if these
have to be produced endogenously.
2Elster, 1985). The basic tenet is that part of a society’s potential welfare is wasted by the
attempt to possess it. As the resources spent on these kind of rent-seeking activities could
have been put to other more beneﬁcial uses, conﬂict behavior may be ineﬃcient. The use
of social norms and moral values that sanction these kind of undesirable behavior has been
proposed as a possible solution to the problem (see e.g. Shavell, 2002). Whereas social
norms regulate a wide array of social interactions, “moral norms are marked out by their
subject matter (interpersonal interaction where signiﬁcant beneﬁts and harms are at stake),
their weight (they typically override other considerations), and the sanctions, both internal
(guilt) and external (blame), attached to their violation”(Hausman and McPherson, 1997,
p. 54). Rules and commandments like the ones mentioned above work in this way. They
work because they intrinsically punish a moral individual for engaging in “amoral” behavior
even if there is no one else present to observe or punish her for it (see e.g. Elster, 1989a).
These rules do not eliminate the incentive to engage in such behavior. However, by inﬂict-
ing feelings like guilt or shame, they do increase the personal cost of conﬂict borne by the
individual and therefore inﬂuence her behavior.
A channel to instill these values in people is eduction. For example, Usher has argued that
there exists a civic externality to schooling, namely the reduction of crime. In his words:
“Education does more than teach skills to enhance one’s capacity to earn income. It perpet-
uates the values of society, ...and promotes the virtues of hard work and honesty”(Usher,
1997, p. 368). While, the ﬁrst category of virtues has the beneﬁt of reducing the per-
sonal disutility of work the latter reduces the beneﬁts received from dishonest or criminal
behavior. He examines in his paper in which circumstances targeted or general education
measures are more useful to reduce criminal behavior. Guttman et al. (1992), for example,
examine in detail how education in the form of taste change can lead to Pareto improve-
ment in a situation involving rent-seeking behavior.2 This leads to the suggestion that a
society should care about investing into social and moral norms of its members by using
appropriate education measures. Two questions follow from this: ﬁrst, is there something
like a “production technology” for something like morality in the ﬁrst place? Second, does
morality really constitute a useful instrument for the reduction of conﬂict behavior? While
the success of religions to deeply shape the preferences of the believers of their communities
on the one hand, as well as sociological theories of moral development (Piaget, 1965; Damon,
1977; Power et al., 1989) on the other hand, seem to allow a tentative yes regarding the ﬁrst
question, we will not inquire in the following, how this technology could look like. Taking
the existence of such a technology as given, instead we will focus on the second question.
In this paper, we will analyze the role morality plays for the reduction of eﬀorts involved into
conﬂict. Often enough the assumption is made that moral people will not steal or violate
2There are other approaches which explain why education in the form of human capital could lead to
reduced conﬂict behavior, too. For example, Grossman and Kim (2004) have raised the argument that
education in the form of investment into human capital could fulﬁll the purpose of deterring people from
conﬂict. Still, their line of argument – namely that increased human capital increases the opportunity costs
of conﬂict of the involved individuals – only holds in environments with endogenous production. As we
want to focus on the eﬀect morality can play, we abstract from these kind of considerations and focus on
environments without production.
3their norms. Accordingly, in most papers addressing the issue, morality is is modelled in a
way that the immoral steal, the moral (or rather more moral) do not (see e.g. Grossman and
Kim (2000, 2004); Usher (1997)). Nevertheless, the existence of morality does not remove the
temptation of stealing or engaging in otherwise personally proﬁtable but socially undesirable
behavior. To capture this conﬂict, we take a diﬀerent approach to the problem as even moral
people might give in to temptation now and then. In this paper, being moral means that the
act of pursuing an aggressive action leads to decreased utility. Being more moral than others
implies a higher disutility from aggression than the one that less moral people face.3 We
will then examine how a change in the morality of the people involved changes the conﬂict
behavior of the individuals. We will furthermore address the issue how the results depend
on whether the change in morality is unilateral or bilateral. The ﬁrst could, for example, be
due to targeted educational policies in which only one party is made subject to a morality
increasing policy. The second could be due to the fact that the educational measures reach
all parties equally.
To understand how morality aﬀects diﬀerent environments with diﬀerent conﬂict technolo-
gies we build a stylized model of morality and conﬂict that compares two situations which
diﬀer in one fundamental aspect: namely, whether property rights to a resource exist or
are non-existent. This will have implications for whether it is possible to diﬀerentiate be-
tween purely aggressive or defensive behavior. We derive several results. First, we show
that morality is an eﬀective instrument to reduce the conﬂict eﬀort of the individual whose
morality has increased. Second, we show that the strategic impact of the given conﬂict tech-
nology operative at the equilibrium is crucial for the eﬀectiveness of morality as a means to
reduce total conﬂict. We will then take the perspective of a policy-maker who is interested
in reducing the total level of aggression or appropriation. If she has access to an education
technology which allows for targeted or general education measures which lead to either a
unilateral or a bilateral increases in morality, the question is addressed what is the best
policy to achieve this goal. If the conﬂict technology does not allow for diﬀerentiation of the
conﬂict eﬀorts into appropriation and defense, we show that a one-sided increase in morality
can lead to increased total conﬂict. We examine two ways to avoid this outcome such that
both individuals reduce their eﬀorts. Using a unilateral education policy requires to target
the individual which was “weaker” to begin with and implies unpleasant distributional con-
sequences. Using a bilateral education policy implies that maximal conﬂict reduction will
not be achieved. Last but not least, we show that if the conﬂict technology allows for sep-
aration of conﬂict eﬀorts into appropriation and defense, a one-sided increase in morality is
enough to reduce appropriation in the economy. In such a context, it is a useful instrument
to support the enforcement of property rights.
Our analysis will proceed along the following lines: in Section 2 we will analyze a situation in
which no previous property rights are in existence and therefore conﬂict technologies cannot
3The author is aware that this use of the term “morality” is rather narrow. For a diﬀerent approach which
sheds light on a diﬀerent treatment of morality or social norms see e.g. Guttman et al. (1992), Kolmar (2003a)
Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) or Traxler (2005). For a short but concise treatment of possible underlying
problems of the social norms which reﬂect a society’s morality see Posner (1997); Elster (1989a,b). For the
possible consequence of the absence of any kind of morality see Hillman (2003).
4be diﬀerentiated with respect to defense and appropriation. We will ﬁrst look at the eﬀects
in an abstract theoretical model and will then apply the results to the concrete example of
a Tullock contest-success function. We will take the perspective of a social planner who is
interested in limiting appropriative behavior and examine what she should do to achieve this
goal. In Section 3 we will then proceed to look at a situation where prior property rights
in the form of claims to a resource exist. This allows for a diﬀerentiation in the conﬂict
technology in the form of conﬂict eﬀorts designated at appropriation and defense. Here, we
will examine whether morals are a useful instrument to support the enforcement of property
rights. Finally, we will conclude in Section 4.
2 The role of morality in situations without property
rights
Before turning to the model itself, a general remark is in order. When thinking about
conﬂicts and their structural diﬀerences, among others one can envision two classiﬁcations
of a situation: one in which there are no clear-cut property rights and in which involved
parties contest for a share of a certain resource, the other in which property rights in the
form of prior claims exist and in which one party tries to appropriate that to which the other
party has a claim.4 The structural diﬀerence of this situation plays itself out when one thinks
about how morality can limit socially undesirable behavior. When thinking about morality
as an instrument to reduce conﬂict behavior by imposing an internal (e.g. emotional) cost ,
to function properly this instrument needs to be able to aim at this behavior precisely. In
the second type of situation, the distinction between aggressive and defensive behavior is
possible. Therefore, morality can target the conﬂict behavior which is deemed undesirable,
namely ‘stealing’, without punishing conﬂict eﬀorts that are not seen as socially harmful. In
the ﬁrst type of situation, this is not possible. Hence, there is no way to distinguish between
socially harmful and not harmful behavior and to target only the ﬁrst. A further thing which
is necessary to allow for a normative distinction between desirable and undesirable conﬂict
eﬀorts is the ability given by the conﬂict technology to commit eﬀorts to one purpose. While
some instruments can be cleanly committed to a defensive or appropriative purpose, others
instruments cannot. A lock or an alarm system is clearly meant for the defense against
thieves whereas prybars or lock-picks obviously are meant to engage in stealing. While such
a classiﬁcation is natural and straightforward in these cases, other instruments, like a gun or
a knife, can be put to both purposes. Both can be used to threaten someone to hand over her
possessions as well as to defend oneself against a mugging. The ability to commit your own
conﬂict eﬀorts is necessary for morality as a conﬂict regulating instrument to distinguish
between socially undesirable behavior – e.g. stealing and killing – and others which are
deemed legitimate – such as defense or self-defense.5 Keeping this in mind, we will see why
this distinction inﬂuences the usefulness of morality as regulating conﬂict behavior.
4By prior claim we mean a claim to a resource which may rest on a formally and legally backed property
right but which might be backed by custom or other reasons as well.
5It should be noted that in these examples the idea of property rights or the form of the given contest
technology has been employed to demonstrate the classiﬁcation of the two environments. Still, the underlying
principle which is needed to make this distinction is the ability to cleanly distinguish whether behavior is seen
52.1 The model
In this section we will analyze the inﬂuence of morality on conﬂict in an environment where
property rights are not speciﬁed or the commitment of conﬂict eﬀorts to just one purpose is
not possible. We will take the perspective of an external party (e.g. a state or social planner)
that is interested in limiting the conﬂict behavior of the involved parties because of the
harmful consequences and the waste of valuable resources which results as a consequence of
engaging in conﬂict. This party has one instrument to punish the behavior it deems socially
undesirable, namely increasing the morality of one or both of the parties via educational
measures. We will understand morality as some internal cost, that punishes the individual
for a certain type of aggressive behavior.6 One way to imagine this is to think of the amount
of guilt the individual feels when engaging in behavior that is not tolerated by its values.
As there is only one type of conﬂict eﬀort, morality cannot discriminate between diﬀerent
purposes and only punish general engagement in conﬂict. The individuals can only decide
how much eﬀort to spend on conﬂict. This will determine the share of a certain resource
which they will be able to appropriate and which is a source of utility. Let the model
be as follows: there are two risk-neutral individuals i, j contesting for a resource R, with
uι = πι R − µι aι as the utility function of individual ι ∈ {i, j}. πι = πι(aι, aκ) is the share
individual ι can secure for herself by the exerted conﬂict eﬀort and is a function of her own
conﬂict eﬀort aι and the other’s eﬀort aκ and therefore reﬂects the conﬂict technology. We
assume that πι is at least twice continuously diﬀerentiable in R2
++ and that πι(aι,0) = 1
for all aι > 0 and πι(0,0) < 1. Both are completely informed about the other individual’s
strength as well as her morality and are able to observe the other’s conﬂict eﬀort. µι is
the morality parameter that measures the internal cost of the individual’s act of conﬂict. It





ι, k, κ ∈ {i, j} and assume the following regularities for the conﬂict technology:
Assumption 1
πi + πj = 1, πι
ι > 0, πι
κ < 0, πι
ιι < 0 and πι
κκ > 0, with ι, κ ∈ {i, j}.8
This means the appropriated share of each individual increases with her own contest eﬀort,
decreases with the other’s contest eﬀort and exhibits decreasing returns to scale in the own
contest eﬀort. πι
ικ measures the change an increase in κ’s conﬂict eﬀort has on ι’s marginal
return on conﬂict. We will call this the strategic eﬀect. If no strategic eﬀect is present,
as bad, and needs to be punished, or as legitimate and therefore socially acceptable. Still, in the following we
will stick to the example of the (non-)existence of property rights to classify these two kinds of situations.
6In this model we therefore take a slightly diﬀerent and narrower perspective on what constitutes morality
than others do. Consequentialists view morality in the acts and not as reﬂected by the underlying moral
dispositions which cause feelings of guilt when violating against moral standards. We will measure the
morality of individuals by the strength of their moral dispositions and use both terms equivalently. For a
wider but more sophisticated look at advantages and problems that come with morality or social norms see
Posner (1997); Posner and Rasmusen (1999); Elster (1989a).
7One can imagine the total cost of conﬂict ˜ µι to be a combination of some general cost of conﬂict, say
ν > 0, and the psychic cost due to morality µι ≥ 0. If ν is assumed to be constant, the total cost of conﬂict
˜ µι = ν + µι only varies if µι, that is, the cost inﬂicted by morality, varies. We will therefore use the above
shortcut for convenience.
8Note, that the sign of last derivative follows automatically from the fact, that the two shares add to one.
6then πι
ικ = 0. If πι
ικ 6= 0 an abstract way to label this strategic eﬀect is by characterizing
whether the conﬂict eﬀorts at the point of equilibrium are strategic substitutes or strategic
complements.9 If the conﬂict eﬀorts are strategic substitutes, a more aggressive strategy of
the other individual lowers the ﬁrst individual’s marginal return of conﬂict. Equivalently,
if the conﬂict eﬀorts are strategic complements, a more aggressive strategy of j raises the
other’s marginal return on conﬂict. Note one important point: this property is individual
speciﬁc. If conﬂict eﬀorts at the point of equilibrium are strategic substitutes from one




ij. For this reason, without loss of generality will will deﬁne i as the
individual from whose point of view the conﬂict eﬀorts are strategic substitutes and j as the
individual from whose point of view conﬂict eﬀorts are strategic complements:
Assumption 2
πi
ij < 0 and π
j
ij > 0.
Both individuals maximize their utility with respect to their contest eﬀorts. Assuming an
interior solution, we get10
π
ι
ι R = µ
ι , (1)
as the optimality condition for each individual ι ∈ {i,j}: the marginal utility of conﬂict has
to equal its marginal cost, which is given by ι’s morality and gives way to the individual’s
reaction function with respect to the other individual’s eﬀort. From these optimality con-
ditions the Nash equilibrium a∗ = (ai∗, aj∗) can be computed. How do these equilibrium
eﬀorts react to changes of each individual’s morality? We derive the following results:
Proposition 1 The eﬀect of increasing the morality of individual i, µi, on the equilibrium
conﬂict eﬀorts is as follows:
(i) her own conﬂict eﬀort ai∗ will decrease.
(ii) If no strategic eﬀect is present, aj∗ will not change. If a strategic eﬀect is present, the
other’s conﬂict eﬀort aj∗ will decrease.
(iii) Therefore, total conﬂict eﬀort ai∗ + aj∗ will decrease.
Proof. Assuming an interior solution, using the Implicit Function Theorem and using the
fact that πi + πj = 1, one can derive the following eﬀects from the system of ﬁrst-order
conditions determining the Nash equilibrium of both individual’s eﬀorts:










9These terms are due to Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985).
10The second order conditions for the individuals hold, as can be easily veriﬁed.
7because of assumption 1 taken with respect to the conﬂict technology.










The denominator is positive by assumption 1. If no strategic eﬀect is present, this corre-
sponds to the case in which πi
ij = 0 and the whole eﬀect is zero. If a strategic eﬀect is present
due to assumption 2 the whole eﬀect will be negative.













which is negative by assumptions 1 and 2.
Equivalently, we get:
Proposition 2 The eﬀect of increasing the morality of individual j, µj, on conﬂict eﬀort is
as follows:
(i) her own conﬂict eﬀort aj∗ will decrease.
(ii) In the absence of strategic eﬀects ai∗ will not change. If a strategic eﬀect is present the
other’s conﬂict eﬀort ai∗ will increase.
(iii) Total conﬂict eﬀort can ai∗ + aj∗ decrease as well as increase.
Proof. Proceeding as in the proof for Proposition 1 we get:














because of assumption 1.














as the denominator is positive due to assumption 1, the sign depends on the numerator. In
the absence of a strategic eﬀect π
j
ij = 0 which implies that the whole eﬀect is zero. If π
j
ij 6= 0
8then numerator is positive due to assumption 2 which implies that ai∗ will increase.
























What is the intuition of these results? If j’s morality increases the individual j will reduce
her eﬀort. As conﬂict eﬀorts are strategic complements from her point of view (because
π
j
ij > 0), at the same time, this increases the marginal utility of conﬂict for individual j
(because πi
ij < 0) giving her an incentive to increase her eﬀort. As a consequence, this
individual will increase the eﬀort she spends on conﬂict even if her own morality has not
changed. The argument for the other case holds analogously. We can therefore observe a
discrepancy between the moral disposition reﬂected by her morality parameter µi and her
behavior. Behavior may not necessarily reﬂect the individual’s underlying morality. The fact
that one individual has become more moral and and adapted her behavior accordingly will
have a feed-back eﬀect on the other individual. Depending on whose morality has changed
this might tempt the other to become more aggressive. As a consequence, this individual
might appear less moral although her underlying morality has not changed. The implication
for total conﬂict eﬀorts is the following: depending on whose morality is changed it can
decrease as well as increase. The latter may only happen, if j’s morality is increased and
if the strategic eﬀect for individual i is stronger than the conﬂict-reducing eﬀect for j. But
if this happens total conﬂict eﬀort increases, even though the morality in the economy (as
measured by the sum of both individuals’ morality) has increased.
The following examples of two parties (countries) that want to appropriate a resource (e.g.
the neighboring strip of land) shall highlight the idea: The conﬂict technology is given by the
two armies, that is soldiers, their weapons and their logistic technology. Their ﬁghting eﬀort
will be determined by the value of the land, their costs and the respective contest technology.
Now, if some change of the situation induces one party, say the “attacker”, to increase one
aspect of her appropriative eﬀort, say, soldiers, the strategic eﬀect which is generated by the
relative strength of the defender against her opponent will determine the defender’s opti-
mal reaction. If the defender’s soldiers are only poorly armed, this party’s optimal reaction
might be to withdraw to a point where she is still able to defend themselves. That is, this
party will lower her eﬀort. But if the defender is armed with automatic guns or equipped
with a better communication technology that allows her to control a larger fraction of the
contested land, the change of the other’s conﬂict eﬀort could lead to the opposite behavior
by the second party. Now, the optimal reaction might be to buy more guns and hire more
soldiers as a response to the other’s increased conﬂict eﬀort. The relative strength of the
available conﬂict technologies determines whether conﬂict eﬀorts are perceived as strategic
complements or strategic substitutes by a party. Note, that already the Romans seem to have
9been aware of this eﬀect as can be seen from their saying “Si vis pacem, para bellum” (If
you want peace, prepare for war). As the romans were the stronger party in most of their
conﬂicts for centuries, making use of their dominant position this strategic eﬀect may well
have worked to their advantage.
The subsequent question is for what kind of situations we actually face strategic substitutes
or complements and whether a policy-maker could make use of this information. In the
literature the eﬀects of the contest technologies and the involved relative strengths are sum-
marized by a function called the contest-success function. Diﬀerent classes of contest-success
functions have been studied in the literature (Skaperdas, 1996; Hirshleifer, 2001; Clarke and
Riis, 1998). One prominent type of contest-success function which is widely used in the
literature encompasses diﬀerent versions of the “Tullock contest-success function” (Tullock
CSF in the following).11 The CSF summarizes the outcome of the conﬂict eﬀorts used by the
involved parties. These eﬀorts could be time and money spent on conﬂict, armies equipped
with the a certain technology – weapons, logistics, and so on. But the conﬂict could also be
interpreted on a wider scale. One such example ﬁtting our model is a situation where both
parties contest for the exploitation of a resource. In such a case, the corresponding contest
eﬀorts could be interpreted as any eﬀort suitable to exploit the resource. One example one
could imagine is the contest for the spoils from a ﬁshery. Here, the conﬂict technology takes
the form of the ships or the ﬁshing technology available, with which they try to appropriate
their shares. Varying contest eﬀorts could then take the form of a diﬀerent number of ships of
a ﬁshing ﬂeet, or the instruments of a more advanced technological level, that tell the ﬁshing
crew where their prey are. If one party would enjoy a relative advantage with respect to her
opponent just because of the technology involved, this might have eﬀects on both parties’
conﬂict eﬀorts. In this context, morality could take the form of norms whose underlying
morals punish overﬁshing or employing destructive ﬁshing methods (drift nets, dynamite)
that harm and threaten to destroy the resource. Other examples for which the model is
applicable include the search for oilﬁelds, exploitation of other common pool resources or
lobbying for some kind of beneﬁt in a rent-seeking context. Keeping this kind of examples
in mind, we will now turn to the results of our model if the contest technology is represented
by the Tullock CSF.
One form with which the Tullock CSF is used speciﬁes the share an individual is able to




θi ai + θj aj . (8)
The parameter θ = θj
θi reﬂects the two parties’ relative technological strength. Obviously, if
θ = 1 this corresponds to equal strengths of both contestants. If θ > 1, party j has a relative
advantage over i. If it is less than 1, j is the disadvantaged party.
11The name of this function in which the ratio of the conﬂict eﬀorts determines the relative success is due
to Tullock’s contribution to the analysis of rent-seeking contests (Tullock, 1980). Diﬀerent versions of the
Tullock CSF allow for asymmetries in the eﬀectiveness of the individuals contest technology while others are
symmetric with respect to the opponents’ strengths. Some versions diﬀer with regards to a scale parameter.
For a detailed treatment of ratio against logistic contest-success functions see Skaperdas (1996); Clarke and
Riis (1998) and Hirshleifer (2001).








(θµi + µj)2 . (10)
As one can see, both parties’ conﬂict eﬀorts are decreasing in their own morality.12 The
impact of θ is ambiguous. Still, one can see that it will move the individuals’ eﬀorts in the
same direction. That is, either both will increase their eﬀorts, or both will decrease their
eﬀorts with an increase in the parameter. Now, if we take the perspective of a policy-maker
who has the opportunity to educate one party with the eﬀect that her morality will increase,
which party should be subjected to this education measure to guarantee that not only this
party’s but also overall conﬂict eﬀorts decrease?
The eﬀect of morality: We know from our theoretical analysis that the eﬀects of an
increase of the morality of i crucially depend on πi





(µj + θµi)(µj − θµi)
R2 θ
. (11)
If, from an ex-ante perspective, a prospective policy-maker anticipating the conﬂict is in-
terested in achieving maximal conﬂict reduction, she should target the morality-increasing
educational policy in a way that both individuals decrease their eﬀorts. From Proposition
1 we know that this is the case if individual i is targeted. So, for which parameter com-
bination will (11) actually be negative? One can see from equation (11) that this is the
case if θµi > µj. That is, j will decrease her eﬀort in a response to i’s increased morality
if the impact of j’s comparative technological advantage is larger than the impact of the
individuals’ relative moral dispositions, that is θ = θj
θi >
µj
µi. If j has a relative technological
advantage (θ > 1) but is less moral than i we know for sure, that her conﬂict eﬀort will
decrease if i’s morality is increased as then θ > 1 ≥
µj
µi.
Note that if θ = 1, this implies that i needs to be more moral than j for contest eﬀorts to
be strategic substitutes. Therefore, to guarantee that both individual’s reduce their conﬂict
eﬀorts, the individual who needs to be subjected to the educational policy is the one, who
was more moral in the ﬁrst place. This is a rather surprising result. Instead of educating
the less moral and therefore more aggressive individual, which might have been expected,
the less aggressive one should be made even more moral than before.
The reason for this is that increasing the morality of the less moral individual j will insure
her reduced conﬂict activity, but the strategic eﬀect might actually tempt the more moral
12Note that, even in a model in which the resource is produced endogenously these qualitative consider-
ations still hold. Equilibrium eﬀorts would look slightly diﬀerent, but the implications with regards to the
sign of the comparative statics are identical.
13The asterisk denotes the fact that the cross derivative is evaluated at the point of equilibrium.
11individual i to engage in more conﬂict. Beforehand, the less moral individual previously
engaged in higher conﬂict activity thereby guaranteing her a larger share of the resource.
As she reduces her eﬀorts this weakens her dominant position and opens the opportunity to
the other party to “close the gap”. The larger the former diﬀerence in morality the stronger
will be the eﬀect on the formerly weaker individual. On the other hand, increasing the more
moral individual’s morality decreases this individual’s eﬀort. In addition, this makes the
“immoral” individual’s position more dominant and allows her to relax her conﬂict eﬀort
without having to fear a reduction in her share of the resource.
The implication of such a policy is that the ﬁnal resource allocation is shifted, favoring the
less moral individual and thereby strengthening the immoral party. The distributional ef-
fects that come along are quite unpleasant from a normative point of view that cares for the
“weak”. To guarantee a low level of conﬂict in an economy, one party has to be suﬃciently
weakened. In short, that person’s moral values must inducer her not to properly defend her
own interest. This guarantees little conﬂict but comes at the price that more moral individ-
uals are disadvantaged with regards to consumption. Morality – if used unilaterally – is an
instrument to strengthen the position of the immoral and punish the moral – an implication
which makes it an instrument of questionable desirablity from a distributional and ethical
point of view.
This basic message extends to the case when θ 6= 1. As we know from above, if j is at a
technological advantage and less moral, conﬂict eﬀorts will deﬁnitely be strategic substitutes
from i’s point of view. In this constellation i will be the ideal policy target to guarantee
decreased eﬀorts from both parties because j will decrease her eﬀorts along with i. The
drawback of this constellation is that j (being less moral and the stronger party) already
had a dominant position before the policy measure could take an eﬀect. Increasing i’s moral
disposition will strengthen j’s position even more with all the unpleasant distributive im-
plications already considered in the case of θ = 1. What happens if the situation is such
that j faces a technological advantage but is more moral, that is either θj > θi and µj > µi
but the condition θµi > µj is fulﬁlled? Does this allow for a policy that does not require
the weaker party to be weakened even further to achieve maximal conﬂict reduction? If me
measure a party’s eﬀective strength by the share of the resource she is able to secure for
herself, the answer is no. From the theoretical analysis of Dixit (1987), we know that one
individual perceives the conﬂict eﬀorts to be strategic substitutes (πi
ij < 0), if the share she
is able to secure was less than 1
2. Therefore, the qualitative conclusion that the formerly
“weaker” party needs to be the target of the educational policy does not change.
Total conﬂict eﬀort Given that the distributional consequences might not be accepted,
the question then is whether the policy-maker should settle for a less ambitious goal. Instead
of striving for maximal conﬂict reduction, the goal could just be to achieve total conﬂict
reduction. Targeting the stronger party – that is j14 – with an educational policy might still
14This follows the fact that we know from Dixit, that π
j
ij > 0 iﬀ πj > 1
2.
12be worth-while if total conﬂict can be reduced. From our previous analysis, we know that














(θµi + µj)(θµi − (2µi + µj))
θR2 . (12)
As one can see, this expression can be negative as well as positive. If neither of the two
contestants has a technological advantage, that is θ = 1, one can show that this expression
will always be negative. In this case, total conﬂict eﬀort will always be reduced, regardless
of which party is made more moral. But if θ 6= 1, total conﬂict eﬀort could actually be
increasing when one party’s morality is increased. Taking a look at (12), we can see that
this will happen if θ > θ∗ =
2µi +µj
µi . So there is a critical θ∗ – which is increasing in µj and
decreasing in µi – that describes the frontier which marks whether a one-sided increase in
j’s morality will lead to increased total conﬂict eﬀort or not. θ∗ > 2, that is, this critical
θ∗ implies that an increase in total conﬂict eﬀort will only happen, if individual i is con-
siderably weaker than individual j who constitutes the target of the educational policy –
suﬃciently weak so that the strategic eﬀect induced by the change in morality dominates
the direct one. This weakness beforehand guaranteed that both engaged in relatively little
conﬂict. Making the stronger more moral and therefore lowering her conﬂict eﬀort increases
the weaker individual’s incentives to engage in the conﬂict so much as to overcompensate
the positive eﬀect gained by i’s reduced aggression.
The implication from this is that the target of an educational policy needs to be well chosen.
Fairness considerations, together with ignoring such issues as strategic aspects, could imply
that the opposite from what was intended, namely less conﬂict, might actually be achieved.
Not paying attention to which of the conﬂicting parties to target can have the disastrous
eﬀect that total conﬂict eﬀort increases, although morality in the economy has increased.
This will particularly happen if the individual who is targeted by the educational policy has a
considerable technological advantage over her adversary. The more moral j, the stronger the
necessary advantage to cause this perverse eﬀect, and the more moral i, the less pronounced
this eﬀect needs to be. A way to guarantee that total conﬂict eﬀort decreases is to insure that
both individuals will decrease their conﬂict eﬀorts after the policy takes eﬀect. We know
that if one individual is weaker with respect to technology and morality, increasing this
individual’s morality will guarantee decreased total conﬂict. Still, this implies distributive
consequences that are unpleasant from a point of view which takes fairness and ethical
considerations into account.
2.2 Universal Education
The results so far have been rather unsettling. They imply that without further knowledge
about which individual actually faces a certain kind of strategic eﬀect, increasing morality
unilaterally can either actually lead to total increased conﬂict eﬀort – that is, the opposite of
what has been intended by the educational measure – or it can have the consequences that
the more moral individual looses out from a distributional perspective. Can these unpleasant
results be changed if all the individuals in the economy are subjected to moral-education, and
their morality increases equally? The corresponding analysis leads to the following result:
13Proposition 3 The eﬀect of increasing both individuals’ morality by the same amount µ is
as follows:
(i) If there are no strategic eﬀects between the contest eﬀorts of the involved individuals, that
is πi
ij = 0, their and total conﬂict eﬀorts will decrease.
(ii) If there are strategic eﬀects, that is πi
ij 6= 0, at j will reduce her conﬂict eﬀort. Whether
i will increase or decrease her eﬀort will depend on the balance of the strategic eﬀect against
the diminishing marginal utility of conﬂict.
(iii) Total conﬂict activity will decrease with an increasing economic-wide morality.
Proof. Deﬁne µi = κi + µ and µj = κj + µ.15 A symmetric and equal increase of both
























(i) If there are no strategic eﬀects on contest eﬀort, πi






















as the denominator is positive, πi
ii < 0 and πi
jj > 0 due to the assumption 1.
(ii) If strategic eﬀects are present, ∂aj
∂µ is unambiguously negative because the denominator
in (14) is positive by Assumption 1 and the numerator is negative by Assumptions 1 and 2.
Whether individual i will increase or decrease her eﬀort will again depend on the relative
strength of the strategic eﬀect with respect to the diminishing marginal returns on conﬂict
eﬀort. The numerator in (13) is positive. Therefore, if −πi
ij ≤ πi
jj then the eﬀort i spends
on conﬂict will decrease (or at least not increase). Else, it will increase.
















due to the fact, that the denominator is positive and the numerator is negative.
15The author is indebted to Johannes M¨ unster for a hint how to generalize a previous result.
14As one can see from (13) and (14), the reaction of both individuals will not necessarily move
in the same direction. j will decrease her conﬂict eﬀort for sure. But whether i does so, too,
will depend on the balance of the “strategic eﬀect” and the “diminishing marginal returns
eﬀect”. As j decreases her conﬂict eﬀort i faces an increased incentive to invest into conﬂict.
This is partly oﬀset, by the fact, that the decreasing marginal returns of the other individual
loose their impact due to her reduced conﬂict eﬀort. If the strategic eﬀect is stronger, she
will increase her conﬂict eﬀort in spite of the increased morality. Still, total conﬂict eﬀort will
decrease, regardless of the shape and strength of the strategic eﬀect because taken together
the strategic eﬀects on both individuals cancel out.
In some of the literature it has been suggested that to limit conﬂict behavior or if a resource
is threatened by over-exploitation or may even be destroyed by the competing behavior of
the involved parties, instilling appropriate social and moral norms to limit such behavior
might be a solution to the problem. Our results show that this might actually be the case.
But to guarantee the decrease of total conﬂict without precise knowledge of the parties’
relative strengths, either all parties need to be subjected to the necessary education or the
increasing of morality needs to be limited to the one from whose perspective the contest
eﬀorts are strategic substitutes. If the latter alternative is chosen, this implies that the
weaker party has to be weakened even more to achieve the desired result. The choice of
universal education seems to be desirable if distributional considerations and not only the
limiting of the waste of resources due to conﬂicts play a role in the policy-maker’s calculus.
The distributional point may be one reason why many societies adopt relatively homogenous
moral norms
3 Morality and Property Rights
Up to now, we have only considered the case that many conﬂict eﬀorts are not speciﬁc and
can be used either for attack or defense. Nevertheless, there exist conﬂict ‘technologies’,
that are fairly speciﬁc: for example, thick walls and strong locks are usually used to defend
your possessions against appropriation. Lock picks, on the other hand, are designed for
appropriation. These technologies only make sense in a surrounding in which the claim
one has on one’s possessions is clear-cut. That is, only if a prior property right exists does
something like ‘defensive action’ have a clear meaning, namely to protect what is yours.
And only in such a context will it be possible to discriminate between purely defensive and
aggressive behavior and to punish the latter by investment in morality. In this context,
we will talk about property rights as a claim to a good (or resource), which nevertheless
still needs to be enforced. We will speak of the eﬀective enforcement of property rights if
the share an individual is able to defend is high. We will abstract from the institutional
enforcement of property rights and focus on how morality supports the private enforcement
of property rights. This leads to an important question: How will the results gained above
change if norms conveying moral judgements about behavior discriminate between aggressive
and defensive eﬀorts?
153.1 The model
We will change the model from section 2.1 as follows: each individual has a claim to a certain
resource Rι and the opportunity to invest either in appropriation aι of the other’s resource
Rκ or to defend herself against the other’s appropriative activities dι, ι 6= κ ∈ {i, j}. πi
denotes the share of the resource each individual is able to defend of her original claim. The
closer it is to 1 the better the enforcement. It reﬂects how well the initial property right to
Rι can actually be enforced. This share is a function of the two contest eﬀorts πι = π(dι, aκ).














ι > 0, πι
κ < 0, πι
ιι < 0, πι
κκ > 0.
Each individual’s utility function is modiﬁed as follows. It gains utility from the consumption
of the defended and stolen resource and disutility from the eﬀorts of defense and appropria-
tion. We will normalize the cost of defense to one and measure the morality of each individual









ι, for ι, κ ∈ {i, j}. (18)
Each individual will then maximize her utility by choosing the eﬀorts of appropriation and
defense. Assuming an interior solution one can get the following results from the system of
ﬁrst-order conditions at the Nash-equilibrium:16
Proposition 4 An increase in the morality of one individual has the following eﬀects:
(i) If i’s morality µi is increased, her appropriative eﬀort ai will be reduced.
(ii) An increase in i’s morality has no eﬀect on her own defensive di or on the other’s ag-
gressive eﬀort aj.
(iii) After an increase of i’s morality, j will decrease her defensive eﬀort dj if appropriation
and defense are strategic complements and increase it if they are strategic substitutes.
(iv) If defense and appropriation are strategic substitutes, then an increase in the morality
of one individual will lower the absolute amount of stealing.
Proof.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing the Nash-equilibrium, we can calculate the
comparative static eﬀects. Using the results we get:
16Again, it can be easily veriﬁed that the second-order conditions for a maximum hold for both individuals.
It can be shown that the results hold in a model in which the resource is produced endogenously.














because of the assumptions in (3).
(ii) One can compute the eﬀect of an increase in individual i’s morality on her own defensive
and the others eﬀort as follows: diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order equations which characterize





∂µi = 0. (20)














This is negative if π
j
ij > 0, that is, defense and appropriation are strategic complements,
and positive if π
j
ij < 0, that is, the two eﬀorts are strategic substitutes.
(iv) Total stolen output S is S = (1 − πi)Ri + (1 − πj)Rj. An increase in the morality of



















So the sign of whole eﬀect depends on ∂dj
∂µi. We know from (iii) that this is positive if π
j
ij < 0,
that is if the two are strategic substitutes. So, in this case the whole expression in brackets
will be positive, and therefore ∂S
∂µi is negative.17
In comparison to section 2.1 we now get a socially more desirable result. Whereas in the
model with undiﬀerentiated conﬂict technologies it could happen that a one-sided increase
of morality could lead to an increase in total appropriative activities, the separation of the
means of conﬂict into pure aggressive or defensive activities enables an increase in morality
to punish only aggressive activities. The clean separation between defense and aggression
enabled by the deﬁnition of the property rights disrupts the strategic eﬀect between aggres-
sive eﬀorts. As a consequence, these activities will unambiguously be reduced if the morality
of the respective individual is increased. Whether, in the end, this will lead to an absolute
reduction of stealing, will depend on the strategic eﬀects of the conﬂict technology involved.
17In the case of strategic complements, it will depend on the strength of the relative eﬀects to determine,
whether the total amount stolen is reduced or actually increases in spite of increased morality and reduced
stealing.
17An interesting implication of the analysis is that defensive measures and morality act as
complements whenever appropriation and defense are strategic substitutes. If conﬂict eﬀorts
are strategic complements, we gain the insight that morality and defense act as substitutes.
The theoretical consequence could be that, due to less stealing and less defense, the total
amount that is actually stolen might increase. This might seem a bit surprising at ﬁrst sight.
The explanation is the following: If conﬂict eﬀorts are strategic substitutes we know, that
an increase in morality will lead to decreased appropriation. Due to the strategic eﬀect, this
will lead to a higher marginal return on defense. In the case of strategic complements, we
know that decreased appropriation will lower the incentives for defensive measures. In a
way, less appropriation leads to more carelessness from the defender’s side. This eﬀect could
in theory overcompensate the reduction of stealing eﬀort. What is the implication of this
result for the security of property rights?
It has been argued that in certain circumstances, in which prizes are small and veriﬁcation
of legal compliance is not easy, the state should invest into social norms for complying with
the law (Shavell, 2002). In our context this could be interpreted as an increase in moral-
ity. What we have learned from our analysis is that this will actually lead to decreased
appropriative eﬀort. But only if appropriation and defense are strategic substitutes will this
actually guarantee a decreased amount of stealing. If appropriation and defense are strategic
complements, the resulting decrease of defense could actually lead to less appropriation but
result in a higher actual percentage of what is actually “stolen”. We will now turn to the
issue regarding what kind of parameters lead to strategic substitutes and complements and
whether the amount stolen actually increases or falls.
3.2 The enforcement of property rights under the Tullock CSF
If the conﬂict technology is be represented by the Tullock CSF, for which kind of parameters
of our CSF will morality guarantee not only reduced appropriative eﬀorts but also a reduced




di + θaj . (23)
The eﬀect of morality From proposition 4, we know that safer property rights are guar-
anteed the moment appropriation and defense are strategic substitutes. When will this be
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(dj∗ + ai∗)3 =
(µi + θ)(µi − θ)
R2 θ
. (26)
18This implies that the two eﬀorts are strategic substitutes and will guarantee safer property
rights if µi < θ. So if the impact from the thief’s morality is less than the technological
advantage she enjoys, a defender will respond with more defense as a reaction to higher
morality from the appropriator’s side.
What happens if the eﬀorts are strategic complements? Then defense will decrease alongside
the other’s appropriative actions. Fortunately enough, total stealing decreases nevertheless
as the thief’s morality is increased. Therefore, property rights can be successfully stabilized
by endowing prospective thieves with values that punish criminal behavior. This can be





θ + µi . (27)
As can be seen, this is decreasing in θ and increasing in the thief’s morality. The higher her
morality, the closer this share is to 1, that is the more secure property rights become.
So the good news is that a prospective policy-maker does not need to keep the relative
positions of morality and the eﬀectiveness of appropriation in mind when deciding on whether
to spend eﬀorts on morality-enhancing education. The eﬀect will reduce stealing regardless
of the parameters. In a situation with relatively low morality but a comparatively eﬀective
appropriation technology, the eﬀect will be especially enhanced due to the resulting increased
defense eﬀorts. So in this case it is especially worthwhile to spend eﬀort in strengthening
values that limit aggressive behavior. But even in a situation in which the conﬂict eﬀorts are
strategic complements which will tempt a defender to become increasingly careless, increasing
the thief’s morality is worthwhile. As long as the conﬂict can be represented by a Tullock
CSF, as speciﬁed above, stealing, either measured in activity or in the appropriated share,
will decrease the more moral a society’s individuals are.
4 Conclusions
We have analyzed the question whether and in which circumstances morality is a good in-
strument to reduce potentially harmful behavior in an economy. We have seen that this
depends on the structure of the conﬂict and the technologies involved. We considered two
diﬀerent environments diﬀering with respect to one central characteristic: whether clear-cut
property rights existed, and therefore, whether morality could discriminate between appro-
priative and defense behavior or not.
In a situation in which the parties contested for the returns of a common resource to which
no previous claims existed, the parties could not distinguish between aggressive and defen-
sive behavior. As a consequence, morality could only target conﬂict behavior per se. The
potential implications diﬀered from the situation in which both parties had a clear claim
to a resource, which they could choose to defend. This structural diﬀerence allowed for
morality to target only aggressive behavior. While not aﬀecting defensive action, moral-
ity became a precise instrument to punish only the socially undesired action. We found
19that the strategic eﬀects implied by a conﬂict technology are crucial to determine whether
morality was useful as an instrument to lower conﬂict or reduce appropriation. When decid-
ing about policy measures to reduce crime and other activities that are deemed undesirable
from a social point of view, it is of utmost importance to take these eﬀects into consideration.
In the ﬁrst case, we found that increasing morality will decrease the conﬂict eﬀort of the
targeted individual but might lead to increased conﬂict eﬀort of the individual who was not
eﬀected by the increase in morality. If the latter individual perceived conﬂict eﬀorts to be
strategic substitutes, this led her to increase conﬂict eﬀort even though her morality had
not changed. The fact that her opponent lowered her conﬂict level increased her marginal
return of conﬂict, inducing her to increase her eﬀort. When turning to the concrete example
of the Tullock CSF, we saw that this happened if the “stronger” individual was the target of
the educational policy. While if both individuals had access to the same conﬂict technology,
the harm from such an eﬀect was limited, we found that this result could not be upheld if
the individuals diﬀered in their strength with regards to the conﬂict technology. In this case
a wrongly targeted educational policy could have a fatal eﬀect: if one individual was suﬃ-
ciently weak to begin with, making the stronger more moral could actually lead to increased
total conﬂict eﬀort. One way to guarantee that such a result will not occur is to choose the
policy’s target carefully. As we saw, this implied that the position of the stronger or less
moral individual was actually strengthened, leading to diﬃcult distributive considerations.
The other way was to assure that both individuals were aﬀected by the educational policy.
Introducing the concept of (a claim to) a property right, the implications changed: We found
that morality was an eﬀective and desirable instrument to support the enforcement of these
very property rights. The reason for this was that the clean labelling of property rights
allowed for a normative distinction between aggression in the form of stealing which was
punished, and defense as an legitimate action. Accepting that this split in the normative
evaluation of activities supports the enforcement of property rights this leads to a subse-
quent question: as defensive eﬀorts still imply a cost, they constitute a waste of resources,
which could be put to other valuable uses. Are there any economic explanations supporting
this diﬀerential normative treatment of conﬂict eﬀorts? This line of questioning promises to
provide interesting thoughts for research on the normative foundations of property rights.
In conclusion, it can be said that morality can be a useful instrument to reduce socially
undesirable behavior if the parameters characterizing the economy fulﬁll certain restrictions.
Still, it has been proposed in the literature that education in the sense of increasing the
human capital of individuals can achieve the same by increasing the opportunity cost of
conﬂict. Compared to morality, which leads to reduced utility of the targeted individual,
it has the advantage that, by increasing the productivity, the direct eﬀect is to increase
the utility of the respective individuals. The argument could also lead into an opposing
direction: as the value of the resource to be appropriated increases the incentives for conﬂict
increase, too. This again might tempt the individuals to engage in more conﬂict, and result
in the corresponding welfare losses. It can be shown that, in the framework of the model
laid out above, increasing the value of the prize leads to increased conﬂict eﬀort. For the
case of a Tullock CSF, this result extends to an economy in which the value of the prize is
20determined endogenously by production. This supports Diamond’s observation that conﬂict
and increased productivity go hand in hand (Diamond, 1998). The issue whether education
in the form of human capital or social norms is more desirable from a social point of view
remains an interesting one which deserves further research.
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